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Corruption, Governance Performance 
and Political Trust in Nigeria 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses Nigerian citizen perception of (a) democracy and the 
economy; (b) the performance of their civilian government, and (c) extent of 
corruption in public institutions and by elected officials and public officers. It 
also examines the effects of corruption and governance performance on the 
approval of and trust in Nigeria’s political institutions. The analysis is based on 
the round 2 version of the Afrobarometer survey and employs descriptive 
analysis, factor analysis, scale item reliability analysis as well as OLS multiple 
regression analysis. Key findings show that one-half of the respondents 
preferred a market economy while a third preferred a government-run economic 
system. More than two thirds preferred democratic governance, while more than 
one-half agreed that the national constitution expresses the values and hopes of 
the Nigerian people. Generally, findings show that trust in public institutions is 
low and that political approval and trust are primarily influenced by how 
government performs in the arenas of socio-economic management and civil 
rights protection. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nigeria has experienced a protracted multidimensional crisis during the past two 
decades in the form of various economic, political and social problems. Some 
manifestations of the crisis of the state and governance in the country are (a) 
inability to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that accord with 
human dignity for the majority of the citizens – two-thirds of Nigerians live 
below the poverty line;  (b) lingering conditions of political instability, 
repression and violence; (c) widespread petty and grand corruption; (d) 
economic decline resulting in  capacity under-utilisation, structural distortion 
(neglect of agriculture and consequent food insecurity, dependence on oil which 
is not articulated to the domestic economy, growth in the nominal sector - 
especially banking and financial institutions trading in government funds and 
foreign exchange, high interest rates that are inimical to industrial development 
and growth), huge debt burden; (e) very high unemployment rate, especially 
among young people in the 18-35 years age bracket who presently constitute 
nearly a third of the population; (f) deterioration of socio-economic 
infrastructure (especially power, road and rail transportation); (g) widening 
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inequality among individuals and between rural and urban communities; (h) 
insecurity of lives and property due to violent crimes and socio-political 
violence engendered by competition over resources, and (i) deterioration of the 
social services – particularly education and health care, which has been made 
worse by structural adjustment programmes implemented by successive 
governments since 1986.  In a substantive sense, Nigeria suffers from state 
failure to guarantee every citizen the right to economic, social, and political 
security and inclusiveness. These problems are often attributed to the protracted 
period of military rule and economic mismanagement. But governance failures 
could also be observed under three different civilian regimes since independence 
(i.e. 1960-66; 1979-1983 and the period since 1999). 
 
In 1999, an elected government, led by Olusegun Obasanjo – a retired army 
general and former military head of state (1976-1979), assumed power after 16 
years of military rule characterised by a high level of corruption, widespread 
repression, and very serious declines in the economic productivity and 
opportunities in the country. But after five years of civil rule and democratic 
transition, many of the inherited socio-political and economic problems are 
worsening. In essence, five years of civil rule has not produced the 
socioeconomic dividends that are expected by citizens and this has created 
tension in the polity. As a result, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with 
the performance of the government, and the trust of citizens in various organs of 
government has also declined over the past three years. From a development 
perspective, the pertinent question is to what extent is the performance of 
government related to trust in political institutions? 
 
Corruption is a serious problem in the country. It is widespread and is 
increasingly being tolerated by the public. Corruption in the country seems to 
have acquired immunity against various political and legal measures aimed at its 
control. The problem is stifling economic development, eroding public 
bureaucratic efficacy, widening inequality, and undermining the creation of 
opportunities and delivery of social services for the citizens, especially those 
who are socially, economically and politically disadvantaged.   In this context, 
the government is regarded as insensitive and unresponsive to the needs of 
citizens. This also contributes to the loss of confidence in government by the 
citizens. Several laws and institutions have been created by the country’s 
successive governments to control corrupt practices. But rather than abating, 
corrupt practices have become endemic even within the police and other 
corruption control organisations.  The ineffectiveness of such agencies 
engendered cynicism among citizens as well as impunity among the rulers and 
officials of government and private enterprises involved in diverse corrupt 
practices.  
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2. Focus of the Study  
 
Social science literature shows that corruption and governance performance 
have implications for citizens’ confidence and trust in their government 
(Anderson and Tverdova 2003). However, the extent of the effects of corruption 
and governance performance on political trust has to be examined empirically in 
different societies, as contextual factors may either aggravate or mitigate the 
relationships among the factors. There has been no empirical study of the effects 
of corruption and governance performance on political trust among social 
scientists in Nigeria, in spite of widespread concern about the issues. This study 
examines the extent of trust in political institutions in the country, and the extent 
to which political trust is determined by governance performance and 
corruption, among other factors. More specifically, the study analyses: 
 
1. Perceptions of governance performance – improvement or deterioration in 
economic and social conditions, and the handling of social, political and 
economic issues and concerns by the government; 
2. Perceptions of level of official corruption in the country’s political 
institutions; 
3. The extent of trust in political institutions in Nigeria;  
4. The effect of corruption and governance performance on trust in Nigeria’s 
political institutions;   
5. These analyses address perceptions of corruption, governance 
performance and citizens’ response in term of approval of and trust in 
political institutions. 
 
 
 
3. Data and Analytical Methods 
 
The data for this study were obtained from Nigeria, the most populous African 
country with an estimated population of 130 million in 20041. Nigeria occupies 
a large land mass of 923,768 square kilometres with vegetation ranging from 
mangrove swamp in the Niger Delta creeks, to tropical rain forest in the south, 
grassland in the central region and Sahel savanna and semi arid land in the far 
north. The country is a federal state made up of 36 states and the Federal Capital 
                                                 
1 The last census was conducted in 1991. The country’s population then was 88,992,200, of 
whom 49.97 were females. In 1991, 64 per cent of the population lived in the rural areas, 
although more recent estimates put the urban/rural ratio at 40/60. 
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Territory, Abuja. It also consists of nearly four hundred ethnic and linguistic 
groups amalgamated into a single political entity through a series of 
amalgamation of peoples and territories between 1861 and 1914 by the British 
imperialist government.2  
 
 
3.1. Data Collection 
 
The data for this study were obtained from the round 2 survey of the 
Afrobarometer in Nigeria conducted in October 20033. Data were collected 
through interviews of a representative sample of adult population (those 
eighteen years and older) in each of the countries based on a multi-stage, 
stratified, clustered sampling approach. A total of 2,428 respondents were 
interviewed. Twenty-nine of the country’s 36 states across the six informal geo-
political zones were covered. The 2003 Survey was administered by the 
Afrobarometer research network in collaboration with Management Systems 
International,  with funding from the United States Agency for International 
Development. A private social survey company based in Lagos – Research and 
Marketing Services – conducted the fieldwork and processed questionnaire data. 
Several Afrobarometer research network associates4 directed the survey design 
and implementation.  
 
The survey questionnaire consisted of many questions designed to tap citizens’ 
perceptions of economic, social, and political conditions and developments; 
attitudes toward democracy and free market; perceptions of government 
performance in handling economic, political and social issues, and perceptions 
of conditions under the present system of civilian government compared to 
military rule5.  The gender and urban/rural distribution of the sample were as 
follows: 50:50 (male/female); 49:51 (rural urban). 
 
                                                 
2 Otite (1990) estimated 387 while Federal Office of Statistics enumerated 354.  
3 The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, 
political and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more 
than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument 
asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared. Trends in public 
attitudes are tracked over time. The aims and publications of the network can be accessed at 
www.afrobarometer.org. 
4 The associates on the projects were Peter Lewis, Etannibi Alemika, Mike Bratton and Derek 
Yul Davids. 
5 The protocol of sampling and the questionnaire for Afrobarometer survey are available on 
the network’s web (www.afrobarometer.org).  
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3.2 Methods of Analysis 
 
Several statistical analytical techniques were employed. They range from 
descriptive analysis (frequencies, percentages and means), factor analysis, scale 
item reliability analysis and correlation to multiple (OLS) regression. Details of 
the analytical procedures used in the analysis are described later in the relevant 
sections.  
 
 
 
4. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
 
The literature and research on political trust have grown very rapidly during the 
past two decades. Most of the works on political trust were undertaken by 
political scientists. Similarly, there has been tremendous growth of literature on 
corruption in Nigeria since the early 1960s. Scholars and researchers across 
various disciplines, especially sociology, criminology, political science and 
economics have contributed to the literature on that subject. Naturally, 
corruption has been defined from the different perspectives of the various 
disciplines. In this section, the literature on corruption, governance performance 
and political trust are reviewed as background to the present work.  
 
 
4.1 Corruption 
 
There are several definitions of corruption in the literature, each of which 
emphasises different aspects of the phenomenon (Alemika 2002, 2003).  The 
Dictionary of Social Sciences (1964: 142) defines corruption as ‘the use of ... 
power for  ... profit, preferment, or prestige, or for the benefit of a group or 
class, in a way that constitutes a breach of law or of standards of high moral 
conduct”.  This definition is one of the few comprehensive descriptions of the 
concept and its manifestations. Khan’s definition of corruption as “... behaviour 
which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of 
someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives 
such as wealth, power or status”, points to the nature of the conduct and the 
underlying motives (Khan 1996: 12). These definitions highlight the elements of 
bribery (financial gains) and abuse of office (for non-financial gains) in 
corruption.  
  
Many definitions of corruption sometimes equate the conduct with bribery. For 
example, Webster Third International Dictionary (1960) defines corruption as ‘a 
price, reward, gift or favour bestowed or promised with a view to pervert 
judgment or corrupt the conduct especially of a person in a position of trust’.  
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This definition is similar to that offered by Kong, who defined corruption as “the 
extraction and acceptance of payment from private entities (be they individual 
citizens or businesses) by public officials, and the private misappropriation and 
abuse of public funds” (Kong 1996:49). Similarly, Dey (1989:503-504) defined 
corruption as “any act undertaken with the deliberate intent of deriving or 
extracting monetary or other benefits by encouraging or conniving at illegal 
activities”. All these definitions focus on bribery. Some other definitions direct 
attention to the nature and effects of corruption. Friedrich (1966) defines 
corruption in term of transaction or exchange between corrupters and corruptees. 
He observes that: 
 
‘… corruption can be said to exist whenever a powerholder who is 
charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible 
functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not 
legally provided for, induced to take actions which favor whoever 
provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public interests’ 
(Friedrich 1966:74). 
 
Bribery is only one form of a corrupt act. Another common form of corruption 
in the context of Nigeria is nepotism in relation to appointment, promotion or 
favour, or award of contracts to kinsmen, friends and associates that is 
widespread in the public sector and private enterprises in violation of subsisting 
rules. Corruption, therefore may involve three distinct but occasionally conjoint 
actions: bribery, nepotism and fraud (embezzlement, inflation of costs of 
services, and forgery).  
 
The extent, pattern and trend of corruption are determined by the political and 
socio-economic conditions in society. Several factors have been identified as 
causes of corruption in Africa: colonial social structure (Ekeh 1975) and neo-
colonialism (Zack-Williams and Alemika 1986).6 Some writers such as Smith 
1964; McMullan 1961; Scott 1969; Leys 1965, explained corruption in Africa as 
a product of traditional practices of gift-giving7, But this is a gross Eurocentric 
misrepresentation.  The traditional culture of gift-giving represents symbolic 
                                                 
6 There were several corruption scandals and probes during the colonial rule. The scandals 
were exposed in the administration of colonial administrative machineries. See for example, 
Bernard Storey (1953) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the 
Lagos Town Council Lagos: Government Printer, and E. W. J. Nicholson (1956) Report of the 
Commission of inquiry into the Administration of Ibadan District Council. Ibadan: 
Government of Western Region. 
7 These writers assume that corruption is absent in Europe and North America or that 
explanations of corruption in Africa must be entirely different from those for the Euro-
American nations, and rooted in culture rather than the operation of the economic and 
political structures. But widespread political and economic corruption have been reported and 
explained in the West (see the Newsweek of April 29, 2002) without recourse to tradition or 
culture.  
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exchange of goodwill and such gifts were publicly presented. It was not a means 
of property accumulation. It is akin to diplomatic exchange of gifts between host 
and visiting heads of state in present times.  
 
Ekeh (1975), in his seminal explanation of corruption in Africa, traced the 
phenomenon to the impact of colonial rule on the Nigerian social structure and 
the multiple and contradictory expectations from individuals by the primordial 
public and the civic public. The primordial public is constituted by the 
categorical identities of ethnicity and religion, while the civic public is the 
public realm of official bureaucracy. According to Ekeh (1994), 
 
‘corruption gathers strength in Africa, and has expanded in scope, 
because it is widely accepted that the use of civic public office and 
funds for the benefit of one’s primordial grouping is legitimate’ (Ekeh 
1994: 245).  
 
Several scholars have attempted to explain corruption in terms of an array of 
political and economic conditions like patrimonialism, clientelism, and 
prebendalism. Richard Joseph (1979) argues that:   
 
‘clientelism and prebendalism are two fundamental principles of 
political organization and behavior in Nigeria. An individual seeks the 
support and protection of an oga or a “godfather,” while trying to 
acquire the basic social and material goods, - loans, scholarships, 
licenses, plots of urban land, employment, promotion - and the main 
resource of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a 
piece of the state ... One way of seeing the extensive corruption in 
Nigeria is as constituting part of the economic assurance of office...’ 
(Joseph 1979: 56-58). 
 
Professor Joseph also highlighted the intricate relationships between 
prebendalism and clientelism, noting that: 
 
‘The existence of a prebendalized state, and the easy adaptation of 
traditional patron-client relationships to the pursuit of modern material 
goods, means that these two features of the system - prebendalism and 
clientelism - are mutually reinforcing. To obtain and keep clients, one 
must gain a prebendal office; and to be sure that in the distribution of 
prebendal offices an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of 
procuring one, clients must be gathered together to make their 
collective claims as well as to prove that the aspirant patron (or 
potential holder of a prebendal office) is a person of consequence 
whose co-optation would be rewarding to the “political 
entrepreneurs”’ (ibid). 
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Rather than interpreting the argument of clientelism and prebendalism as 
cultural products, it is better to understand it in relation to the process of the 
composition of the colonial states in Africa and the ethnicisation of the 
relationship between groups by the colonisers in order to divide and rule the 
colonised (Mamdani 1996). This bred ethno-religious cleavages and 
competitions for state resources. Political entrepreneurs develop among the 
respective groups as representatives in the struggle for state resources among the 
constituent groups and as patrons in relation to their own group. Besides, 
colonialism created a system of power that was not answerable or accountable to 
the local community. Hence, the communities or indigenous constituents of the 
colonial society were not empowered to demand accountability from the 
colonial rulers or their local allies, including traditional rulers, whose status and 
functions were transformed by the colonial encounter and accreditation through 
the indirect rule system (Ekeh 1980; Mamdani 1996). The creation of a political 
power structure and bureaucratic apparatus that existed outside the reach and 
control of the mass of the citizenry during colonialism and maintained by post-
colonial rulers, contributed to the scale and persistence of corruption in post-
colonial Africa.  
 
Several sources or causes of corruption have been articulated in the literature. 
The particular source or cause of corruption is emphasised by a researcher 
depends on his/her training and ideological leaning. According to Yves Meny: 
 
‘The causes of corruption are sought in wholly different directions, 
depending on the ideological stance and preferences of the seeker. The 
neo-liberal school (which has contributed to the analysis of the 
phenomenon) considers corruption to be one of the effects of the black 
market caused by excessive state intervention. The more the state 
intervenes, the more it legislates, and the more it develops interfering 
bureaucracies, the greater the risks of parallel procedures and markets 
spawning unlawful conduct. On the other hand, those who are not 
convinced of the state’s intrinsic perversity or the market’s 
unquestionable merits stress another aspect: the erosion of public 
ethics, the loss of state’s legitimate status as the incarnation of the 
general interest, and the dilution of communal values through the 
pursuit of profit and the defence of selfish private interests’ (Yves 
Meny 1996: 309). 
 
Social science literature has associated corruption with the following problems: 
• Loss of revenues of government; 
• Loss of government funds through cost-inflation, poor quality services; 
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• Inequality in service delivery as service provisioning is influenced by 
either ability to bribe or nepotism or clientelistic relationships with 
officials; 
• Erosion of the rule of law; 
• Widening economic and political inequalities; 
• Hampering investment and economic growth because it produces 
additional unproductive costs (Theobald 1990; Seligson 2002; Goldsmith 
1999; Alemika 2002; Montinola and Jackman 2002). 
 
However, corruption has not always been considered dysfunctional. Some 
scholars argued that bribery may serve as ‘speed money’ in an environment 
characterised by a bureaucratic bottleneck. Corruption may also make it possible 
for certain groups of people excluded from services to obtain them (Huntington 
1968; Nye 1967). 
 
  
4.2 Corruption and Political Trust 
 
Corruption engenders various social, economic and political problems that can 
erode trust in political institutions (Seligson 2002). For example, Anderson and 
Tverdova (2003) in their analysis found a strong correlation of high levels of 
corruption with negative evaluations of the political system as well as low level 
of trust in public officials. Democratisation is prescribed as a cure for 
corruption. LeVine (1993) argues that: 
 
‘While administrative corruption cannot be eliminated, it can be 
limited … attempts at limitation are more likely to succeed the farther 
the country is along the democratization path. The more democracy, 
the more likely that mechanisms will have been put in place to 
monitor the performance of administrators and bureaucrats’ (LeVine 
1993: 271). 
 
However, democratisation may generate some form of corruption in its early 
phase and thereby erode trust in government (Moran 2001). Democratisation 
and economic liberalisation in Eastern Europe and Africa have resulted in the 
weakening and failure of state in relation to delivery of socio-economic goods 
and services. Moran (2001) observes that: 
 
‘State strength and/or legitimacy is an important correlate with 
corruption. Where state capacity in the areas of law 
enforcement/social control is limited in the face of increased social 
and political freedom, corruption and crime may develop. Where the 
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state cannot satisfy demands for basic social services, regime 
legitimacy may decline, leading to petty corruption and crime’ (Moran 
2001: 389). 
 
Moran further argues that: 
 
‘economic reform whose effects create unemployment, poverty, 
and/or inequality … may lead to an increase in petty crime and 
corruption by citizens struggling ‘to get by’” (Moran 2001: 387).   
 
In Nigeria, democratic transition and economic liberalisation programmes were 
introduced simultaneously in 1986/87 by the military regime led by Babangida. 
The implementation of  the liberalisation programme (essentially deregulation of 
foreign exchange, privatisation, abdication of responsibility in social services 
provisioning by government, liberalised import regime which favoured dumping 
of foreign goods)  was steered by technocrats, some of whom had prior 
employment with the IMF or World Bank. However, the democratic transition 
was manipulated and eventually abandoned while the economic liberalisation 
that witnessed opposition from several sectors of society, especially among 
students, workers and professional groups, was implemented with a heavy dose 
of legal and political repression of its opponents (Olukoshi 1993 Jega 2000; 
Alemika 1998). The resulting effects have been the aggravation of the country’s 
socio-economic crises such that Nigeria is worse off today than it was before the 
introduction of economic adjustment in 1986. The present civilian government 
has redesigned the programme. There has also been constant harassment of the 
government by IMF and World Bank demanding accelerated implementation of 
the programme, in spite of widespread opposition from the citizens. As was the 
case with the implementation of economic liberalisation programmes in the 
country in the 1980s by the military government, the current civilian 
government has recruited Nigerian employees of the IMF8 and World Bank to 
implement its economic policies.  The Obasanjo government has also repressed 
opposition to aspects of the programme that are considered inimical to the 
development of the country. Demonstrations and labour opposition to the 
programme have been subjected to repression in the form of arrest and the, 
extra-judicial killing of demonstrating labour union members in 2003 and 2004 
by the police.  
 
Western governments, the media and scholars are quick to point to the 
involvement of Nigerian citizens in a variety of non-violent economic crimes in 
different countries. But what they often ignore or failed/refused to acknowledge 
is that these activities emerged in response to the deprivations and repression 
engendered by economic liberalisation that they foisted on the country, from 
                                                 
8 The Minister of Finance was appointed from her position with the IMF as a Vice-President.  
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1986, through the IMF and World Bank and admonitions/threats of advanced 
capitalist nations. With the impoverishment caused by economic liberalisation, 
Nigerian intellectuals and professionals in large numbers emigrated to North 
America and Europe. Hundreds of medical personnel also emigrated to the 
Middle East, especially, Saudi Arabia. Nigerian students were stranded in 
Europe and North America because of the sudden devaluation of the currency 
which made it impossible to pay their fees. Some students resorted to crime, 
including drug trafficking (Obot 2004) and the popular ‘419’ or advance fee 
fraud that has been used as a bait to defraud equally criminally-minded 
Europeans and Americans who wanted to collude and steal public funds from 
Nigeria. Young Nigerians continue to make desperate efforts also to escape the 
economic deprivations in the country. One of the effects of the brain drain, 
caused by the economic liberalisation programme, is the disintegration of 
economic and social services systems. It is therefore not surprising that 73% of 
respondents in the Afrobarometer Survey conducted in October 2003 said that 
the economic policy has hurt most people and benefited only a few.  
 
Corruption erodes trust in government because it engenders a condition whereby 
public goods are only obtained if a citizen has either connections with officials 
or money, or both (Treisman 2000).   High levels of corruption have also been 
reported as a predictor of diminished support for democracy as well as 
diminished opposition to undemocratic alternative forms of government (Rose, 
Rose et al 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001). More cogently, Anderson and 
Tverdova reported that “individuals in countries with higher levels of corruption 
evaluate the system more negatively … corruption breeds discontent with the 
performance of the political system” (2003: 99).  
 
 
4.3 Performance, Democratic Legitimation and 
Political Trust 
 
To what extent does performance by the incumbent government influence 
support for democracy and trust in political institutions? The question can be 
confusing because citizens relate simultaneously to three interrelated realities – 
the state, regime and government. Bratton and Mattes (2001: 453, fn. 13) 
propose that “Regimes are sets of rules, states are sets of institutions, and 
governments are sets of leaders”. While regimes set structural limits of 
activities, performance is a product of quality of governance – decision-making 
and policy formulation/implementation by incumbent governments. 
Consequently, performance may be understood as either a product of the regime 
(structure and rules) that govern the nature and scope of permissible policies or a 
consequence of the policies and actions of government in power. The impact of 
performance on (a) support for and satisfaction with regime, and (b) trust and 
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approval of government have received substantial attention in the literature 
(Weil 1989; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Vassilev 2004; Montero et al. 1997; 
Evans and Whitefield 1995; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Weatherford 
1992). 
 
One critical area of confusion and disagreement is what constitutes democracy. 
When people support democracy, what sort of institutional structures, rules, 
roles, relations and outcomes do they have in mind? It was this problem that 
formed the focus of the discussion in the paper by Collier and Levitsky (1997), 
entitled Democracy with Adjectives. Hubber et al (1997) provided a lucid 
description of the three popular conception of democracy and the relationship 
among them as well as associated problems.   They identified three forms of 
democracy – formal, participatory and social democracy. They defined formal 
democracy as “a political system that combines four features: regular free and 
fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the state’s administrative 
organs to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for freedom of 
expression and association as protection against arbitrary state action” (Ibid: 
323). They refer to a political system as participatory democracy, if in addition 
to the four requirements enumerated above, it also ensures “high levels of 
participation without systematic differences across social categories (for 
example, class, ethnicity, gender)” (Ibid: 324). Finally they defined social 
democracy as a political system that in addition to the five properties of 
participatory democracy also embodied “increasing equality in social and 
economic outcomes” (Ibid: 324). In their discussion, therefore, social 
democracy is the most advanced form of democracy while the formal 
democracy remains the most elementary. When citizens are asked whether or 
not they prefer democracy, it is important to question which level of democracy 
they have in mind when they respond. Equally important is the question of 
which level of democracy is regarded as legitimate expectations of the citizens 
by the investigator. Stemming from the cold war ideological divide, liberal 
political scientists often become defensive when democracy is defined in terms 
of social democracy (Ake 1996; Bratton and Mattes 2001). But the question of 
what form of democracy is supported by citizens is often ignored in the 
discussion of democratic legitimation by mainstream liberal political scientists. 
 
Schumpeter (1975) argued that support for the government in a democratic 
nation is influenced by its performance in service delivery. According to him, 
democracy involves competition among parties and political elites who in 
competitive elections promise to provide services to citizens in return for their 
votes. If a government is elected but fails to deliver goods and services, its 
legitimacy will decline. His solution to avoiding legitimation deficit is either to 
increase government’s capacity to match its promise for service delivery or 
reduce citizens’ demand. This approach is associated with the notion of 
‘revolution of rising expectation or entitlements’ or overload of the political 
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system by citizens’ demand. Others have pointed out that confidence in state 
institutions represents citizens’ perception that the government represents or 
protects their interests (Weil 1989).  
 
Performance, according to Weil (1989: 686) refers to “state’s output of services 
to the population that assure economic benefits and civil order”. Bratton and 
Mattes (2001) disputed the importance of economic performance in the level of 
support for regime by citizens. They criticised those authors (Ake 1996; Elster 
1993) who emphasise economic performance as a precondition for democratic 
consolidation. Their criticism is borne out of their ideological preference for a 
minimalist definition of democracy, limited to delivery of political goods. But 
there are other definitions of democracy, which they acknowledge (Bratton and 
Mattes 2001: 451). Performance should not be reduced to the delivery of either 
economic goods or political goods. In Africa, a holistic performance assessment 
combining economic and political goods influence approval of and trust in 
government, as the analysis by Bratton and Mattes showed. But Bratton and 
Mattes rejected the logic of their robust analysis and result and rather preferred 
to stick to their a priori ideologically-driven or laden preference for formal 
democracy rather than social democracy that Ake (1996) canvassed9. 
Democracy, properly understood, as Ake (1996) argued, refers to freedom in all 
domains and is not limited to formal political freedoms, which cannot be fully 
realised in a society characterised by extreme socio-economic inequalities. 
Africans interviewed in the 2002/2003 round of Afrobarometer Survey reject 
extremes of capitalism and planned economy (Bratton et al. 2004). It is logical 
to expect that their legitimation of democracy as well as evaluation of 
government performance will be influenced by their economic regime choices or 
preferences.  
 
Democratic values and practices are not products of modern European 
civilization as many anthropological works show (Mair 1962; Evans-Pritchard 
and Fortes 1940).  But it is common for some scholars to confuse or reify a 
concept like democracy constructed in a particular language, especially by 
native speakers of such language with the principles and practices captures by 
the language. Thus societies may share principles and practices but differ in 
their linguistic expression. Such problem can be observed in the statement by 
Bratton and Mattes that: 
 
                                                 
9 Contrast their results and discussion on pages 465-471, 473 – 474 on demands for both 
economic and political performance with their strong conclusion on page 474 that their results 
“counter the economistic arguments that the market will legitimate democracy”. They equate 
market with economy, a very questionable position borne out of their commitment to 
liberalism with two sides – on one side is formal political freedom emptied of socio-economic 
equity and on the other capitalism anchored on its wide known virtues and vices of efficiency 
and exploitation respectively. 
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‘If the denizens of the world’s poorest continent make ‘separate and 
correct’ distinctions between ‘a basket of economic goods (which may 
be deteriorating) and a basket of political goods (which may be 
improving)’, then citizens everywhere are likely to do so…If 
democracy is valued by citizens as an end in itself in Africa, then this 
generalization probably holds good universally’ (Ibid: 449). 
 
It is not clear what the expression was intended to convey but it appears to 
follow the reasoning of colonial anthropology that adopts a unilinear 
evolutionary category in which European practices reflect civilization and 
African cultures manifest barbarism or backwardness. Why should Africa’s 
understanding be the basis to assert that if Africans valued democracy, then 
others will do so or that if they can separate economic goods from political 
goods then ‘citizens everywhere are likely to do so’ (Ibid: 449)? 
Anthropologists (including their colonial genre) acknowledge that African 
societies valued freedom, equity and justice and therefore incorporated check 
and balances in their institutions (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1940; Mair 1962).  
 
Trust in political institutions and support for regimes are more frequently tapped 
through social surveys by social scientists. But often, the concepts are hardly 
fully defined. Trust judgment according to Miller and Listhaug (1990: 358): 
 
‘… reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and 
institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations 
held by the public. Citizen expectations of how government should 
operate include among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable, honest, 
efficient, and responsive to society’s need. In brief, an expression of 
trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and 
support) is a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will 
do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny’ (Miller and 
Listhaug 1990: 358). 
 
Evaluation of performance in Africa cannot be divorced from the peoples’ 
experiences with colonial oppression and post-colonial authoritarianism. Shivji 
(1990: 383) observes that the colonial governments in Africa were despotic. 
According to him: 
 
‘Its legal order was exactly the opposite of that prescribed by 
constitutionalism. Power was concentrated in the executive, usually in 
the person of governor, while justice was dispensed by an 
administrator, often a district commissioner. The legislature, if one 
existed at all, was packed by the governor’s appointees while 
fundamental human rights, particularly those which might have had 
any political impact, were conspicuous by their absence …  Forced 
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labour and unlimited power of arrest by administrators completed the 
armoury of an essentially quasi-military colonial state’. 
 
‘The deeper structures of the colonial political and legal order were 
inherited or, in some cases, reorganized to reinforce despotism in the 
post-independence period. The constitutional order established at 
independence was therefore, as it were, an excrescence. Through 
amendment, modifications or overthrow, constitutions soon came to 
correspond to the overall legal order’ (Shivji 1990: 383). 
 
African successor governments have also adopted repression as instrument of 
governance. It is therefore understandable if Africans emphasise the civil rights 
components of democracy. But nonetheless also demand delivery of economic 
goods (Ake 1978, 1996; Bratton and Mattes 2001).  
 
 
 
5. Analysis 
 
 
5.1 Political Economy, Official Corruption, Regime 
Performance and Political Trust 
 
The extent of official corruption, regime performance and political trust are 
influenced by the political and economic structure of society and embedded 
social relations.   To understand public perception of official corruption and 
performance by the incumbent government as well as their trust in the nation’s 
core political institutions, it is necessary to examine the attitudes of the citizens 
toward the nation’s political economy. The first part of this analytical section 
examines attitudes toward political and economic systems, extent of expressed 
preferences for democracy and free market economic system. It also analyses 
the perceptions of official corruption and performance by government in 2003 
relative to the results obtained in the survey conducted in the country by 
Afrobarometer in 2001. 
 
 
5.1.1 Attitudes Toward Democracy and the Nigerian 
Constitution  
 
What are the preferences of Nigerian citizens in respect of political system for 
the nation? Results of our analysis of the Afrobarometer Survey conducted in 
October 2003 show that more than two-thirds (68%) of Nigerian respondents 
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prefer democracy to non-democratic systems of government. The decline in 
preference for democracy between 2001 and 2003 was marginal (table 1). 
However, more than three-fifths of Nigerians were dissatisfied with the way 
democracy works or is practiced in their country. 
 
 
Table 1: Attitudes to Democracy and National Constitution 
 
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? 2001 % 2003 % 
A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can 
be preferable 
C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have 
• Don’t know 
71 
15 
 
12 
 
2 
68 
20 
 
11 
 
2 
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
Nigeria? 
 
• Very satisfied 
• Fairly satisfied 
• Not very satisfied 
• Not at all satisfied 
• Not a democracy 
• Don’t know 
12 
45 
31 
11 
1 
2 
6 
29 
31 
31 
2 
2 
Do you disagree or agree with the statement that ‘Our 
constitution expresses the values and hopes of the Nigerian 
people?  
 
• Strongly disagree/Disagree 
• Neither agree nor disagree 
• Agree/Strongly agree 
• Don’t know 
22 
14 
56 
9 
23 
15 
56 
6 
Which of the following statement is closest to your view: A or B?  
A. Democracy is worth having simply because it allows 
everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions 
B. Democracy is only worth having if it can address 
everyone’s basic economic needs 
• Do not agree with either 
• Don’t know 
52 
 
43 
 
4 
1 
56 
 
41 
 
1 
2 
Note: Due to rounding-up, total percentage do not always add to 100. 
 
Nigerians embrace democracy as an instrument of promoting both political 
liberties and economic wellbeing. Thus, minimal democracy in terms of election 
and civic liberties alone (the hallmark of liberal democracy) will not meet the 
aspirations of Nigerians (Ake 1996, 2000) and probably accounts for the 
apparent gap between preference for and satisfaction with democracy in the 
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country (table 1). Democratic legitimation is not based on either intrinsic values 
or instrumental values (Bratton and Mattes, 2001) but on both.  
 
The constitution of a country is its primary law that define the juridical structure 
and powers of the state; functions of government, rights and duties of citizens. 
Since 1999, when the present Constitution came into effect, there has been 
clamour for its review. Proponents of its review through either sovereign 
national conference or constitutional conference argue that it was promulgated 
by the military regime and therefore does not meet the aspirations of the citizens 
in a democratic federal state. But there are those who believe that the 1999 
Constitution is largely a review of the 1979 Constitution that was applicable 
during the Second Republic (1979-1983) before it was suspended by the military 
junta that seized power on December 31, 1983. People in this group argue that 
the constitution be allowed to grow through judicial review. In view of the 
raging controversy over the constitution, it is important to understand to what 
extent Nigerians accepted the constitution as expression of their values and 
hopes. The majority of the respondents (56%) said that the constitution 
expresses the values and hope of the people of the country against 23% who 
thought that it does not (table 1). Significantly, the responses to the question 
were virtually similar in the 2001 and 2003 surveys. 
 
 
5.1.2 Attitudes Toward Economic Systems and 
Government’s Economic Policies 
 
During the early years of independence from British colonial rule, successive 
Nigerian governments promoted what was called a ‘mixed economic’ system. 
This entailed an active government involvement in and regulation of the 
economy to achieve rapid development, along with private competitive 
entrepreneurship. As a result, the governments at the national and regional levels 
established and ran several economic enterprises while also expanding those it 
inherited from the colonial authority (e.g. Agricultural marketing boards, 
railways, telecommunications, banks, electricity; the textile industry, etc. which 
served as an instrument of colonial exploitation and control). The high 
involvement of government in the economy was justified with reference to the 
need to promote balanced development across economic sectors and regions; 
and also for government to mobilise and invest resources required for the rapid 
development of the economy and socioeconomic infrastructure – resources 
which cannot be generated by the population given the high level of poverty, 
inadequate technical and entrepreneurial skill. Nigeria’s first and second 
development plans 1962 -74 pointedly adopted the mixed economy system and 
import substitution industrialisation strategy. The introduction of the 
Indigenisation Programme – that limited foreign control (ownership of 
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enterprises) of the economy - in the 1970s further extended the involvement of 
government in the economy.  
 
Historically, therefore, the involvement of government in the economy as both 
investor and regulator started during the colonial era and expanded in the first 
two and a half decades of independence. In 1986, the military government led 
by General Ibrahim Babangida, on advice (or harassment?) from the IMF, 
World Bank and foreign creditor, introduced a structural adjustment programme. 
Some of the most critical components of the programme were commitment to 
liberalisation, privatisation of public enterprises, commercialisation of social 
services and public utilities (especially education and health care) and 
downsizing of the public service, and market determined foreign exchange rates 
(Olukoshi 1993; Ihonvbere 1991; Onimode 1988; Alemika 1998). Several 
groups resisted the programme on various grounds: imposition by imperialist 
institutions; its illogicality given that Nigeria had nothing to sell in the 
international arena beyond oil and devaluation would only have made imported 
goods expensive without alternative local substitutes, authoritarianism which its 
implementation engendered. The government heavily repressed the various 
groups that were opposed to the programme (Alemika 1998; Jega 2000).  
 
The programme which has been implemented for the past two decades with 
varying commitment by successive governments has been held responsible for 
the mass impoverishment of Nigerian people, the decay of infrastructure and 
social services (particularly education, health care). The privatised enterprises, 
where they have not ceased to exist, have not demonstrated greater efficiency 
than when they were publicly owned. Only the privatised bank remained 
profitable, though their impact on Nigerian economy is questionable. Overall, 
the transition to ‘free-racketeering’ capitalism favoured by IMF, World Bank 
and ‘Creditor’ nations have unleashed social, economic and political tragedies 
on the country (Alemika 1998, Jega 2000).  
 
In the context of the experience of the adjustment programme, what are the 
preferences of Nigerians regarding an economic system for their country? Fifty 
percent of the respondents preferred a free market economy while a third 
preferred an economy run by the government – a pattern of response that points 
toward a mixed economy policy approach and choice for the country. Very 
significant is the fact that two-thirds of the Nigerian respondents were 
dissatisfied with government’s reduced role in the economy (table 2). 
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Table 2: Attitudes Toward Economic Systems and Government 
Economic Policies 
 
Which of the following three statements is closest to your own 
opinion? 
2001 % 2003 % 
A. A free market economy is preferable to an economy run by 
the government 
B. A government-run economy is preferable to a free market 
economy 
C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of 
economic system we have. 
54 
 
27 
 
16 
50 
 
33 
 
13 
As you may know, the government has reduced its role in the 
economy. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way this policy 
works? 
 
• Very satisfied 
• Fairly satisfied 
• Not very satisfied 
• Not at all satisfied 
• Government has not reduced its role 
• Don’t know 
11 
40 
26 
16 
2 
5 
5 
29 
28 
31 
3 
4 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view: A or B?  
A. The government’s economic policies have helped most 
people, only a few have suffered. 
B. The government’s economic policies have hurt most 
people and only a few have benefited. 
• Do not agree with either 
• Don’t know 
23 
 
72 
 
3 
2 
24 
 
73 
 
2 
1 
 
A large majority (73%) of the respondents said that the liberalisation and 
privatisation programmes have hurt most people and benefited only a few. The 
overall implication is that Nigerians do not support the liberalisation 
programmes, understandably, that have engendered serious economic and social 
decline in the country (Jega 2000; Alemika 1998). 
 
 
5.1.3 Economic and Political Systems’ Preferences and 
Democratic Legitimation  
 
Are there relationships between preference for democracy and preference for 
market economy? Result of our contingency analysis in table 3 show that a 
significant relation does exist. Those who preferred a market economy were also 
more likely to prefer a democratic system of governance. Conversely, 
individuals who were willing to accommodate non-democratic government in 
certain circumstances were also more likely to prefer a government-run 
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economy. However, the majority of both groups –  market and planned economy 
advocates – actually prefer democracy.10  
 
 
Table 3: Economic and Political Systems’ Preferences 
 
Political system preference  
Economic system preference Non-democratic alternatives Democracy 
Government-run economy                     28.5 
                    (207) 
     71.5 
     (519) 
Free market economy                     16.8 
                    (184) 
      83.2 
     (91.3) 
X2 = 35.7; df =1; p< .01 
 
The result is understandable because over the past two decades, transition to 
civil rule programmes in the country have been implemented along with 
liberalisation, privatisation and commercialisation policies. Thus, transitions to 
civil rule and market economy have been pursued contemporaneously. This 
tends to complicate and engender opposition to the implementation of the 
economic programmes. In response, the government either modifies aspects of 
the economic policy or intensifies repression of opposition, thereby undermining 
democratic consolidation (Przeworski 1991). 
 
 
Table 4: Legitimation of Democracy and Economic System Preference 
 
Economic system preference  
Legitimation of Democracy Government-run economy Free market economy 
Economic goods                     44.7 
                   (364) 
               55.3 
              (450) 
Political goods                    36.8 
                  (430) 
              63.2 
             (738) 
X2 = 12.5; df = 1; p, .01 
 
What are the factors that legitimise or consolidate democracy in transitional 
countries? Are they socio-economic performance (improving social and 
economic well-being of citizens) or political performance variables (recognising 
and protecting human rights, rule of law, ensuring free and fair elections)? Or 
both? Ake (1996) argued that political or formal democracy is grossly 
                                                 
10 The framing of the question does not distinguish in exclusive terms those who prefer 
democracy and those who chose non-democratic alternatives. For example, respondents may 
ordinarily prefer democracy but willing to accommodate in some circumstances, non-
democratic alternatives. To that extent he/she is basically a ‘democrat’. Those who are willing 
to accommodate non-democratic alternatives are rather ‘conditional democrats’.  
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inadequate as a solution to the African crises (Onimode 1988); rather a more 
holistic political and socio-economic democracy is required. Data presented in 
table 4 show that Nigerian respondents who value democracy for its economic 
dividends were more likely to support a government-run economy than their 
counterparts who valued democracy in political terms (table 4). 
 
 
5.1.4 Perception of Corruption in Nigerian Political 
Institutions 
 
For four consecutive years from 1999 to 2002, Nigeria was classified as either 
the most corrupt or second most corrupt nation in the world by the Transparency 
International in its Corruption Perception Index11.  Several laws have been 
enacted and many agencies established in the past to control corrupt practices in 
the country. Large scale corruption started in the 1970s as collusion between 
foreign businesses and government officials12. Since then corruption has seeped 
through all facets of life in the country (Alemika 2002, 2003).  
 
Nigerian public perception of corruption has rarely been studied in the country, 
using the scientific methodology, until fairly recently. The Afrobarometer 
Survey employs such methodology and asked questions on public perception of 
corruption in governmental and non-governmental institutions.  Results from the 
2001 and 2003 surveys show that public officials are widely perceived as 
corrupt (table 5). 
                                                 
11 The weak methodological design of the Index is often ignored and the index’s popularity 
among Western governments, media and scholars as reliable and valid basis for judging 
countries is unwarranted. Respondents are dominated by business executives often aliens to or 
in the countries that they evaluate. Secondly, it does not take account of the fact that foreign 
entrepreneurs are rightly or wrongly seen in many developing countries as ‘vultures’ and 
imperialist agents who must be resisted and made to pay ‘bribe’ for their expropriation of the 
countries’ resources. In Nigeria, I have met several middle- and top-level government 
officials who express disgust at the collusion between foreign businesses and the country’s 
rulers to export national wealth through illegal channels and activities detrimental to the 
country. A few said they would make their cut from such corrupt foreign entrepreneurs before 
they carry away their loot. The Afrobarometer Survey of 2001 and 2003 shows, for example, 
that 87% and 79% of some/most/all foreign businesses in the country are seen as corrupt 
respectively.  
12 Instances of these were found in 1975 and 1976 when the military regime led by Murtala 
Muhammed instituted investigations into many government projects. See (a) Federal 
Government of Nigeria (1976) Federal Military Government’s Views on the Report of the 
Tribunal of Inquiry Into the Importation of Cement”; (b) Federal Government of Nigeria 
(1978) “Government Views on Second Report of the Federal Assets Investigation Panel.”, 
and (c) Federal Government of Nigeria (1978) “Government Views on the Report of the Panel 
of Inquiry into the Purchase of Leyland Buses for FESTAC from British Leyland”. 
 
 22
Table 5: Perceptions of Level of Official Corruption in Government 
Institutions 
 
Most or all 
of them 
   % 
How many of the following people do you 
think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say? 
None or 
some of 
them 
   % 
2003 
 
2001 
 
2003 
Don’t know or 
haven’t heard 
enough to say 
  % 
2003 
The President and officials in his office 47 34 48 4 
Elected leaders (Legislators and 
Councillors) 
43 43 53 5 
Judges and magistrates 48 34 42 10 
Government officials 42 44 55 3 
Border officials (Customs/Immigration) 35 52 57 8 
Police 28 66 70 2 
 
 
None of the institutions were perceived as non-corrupt by up to one-half of the 
respondents. The police and the border officials were perceived as most corrupt 
while the judges and magistrates, and the president and officials in his office 
were rated as least corrupt (table 5). Corruption in the Nigeria Police Force is 
widespread at all levels. But it is especially common or more visible among the 
junior officials posted on general duty as investigation officers, prosecutors, 
highway patrol officials, task forces with whom most citizens have involuntary 
contacts (Alemika 2003; Alemika and Chuckwuma 2000). But most of the cases 
of corruption and extortion by policemen involve small amounts of money 
collected as ‘tolls’, frequently in the range of 20-100 Naira (less than one 
American dollar). This form of corruption contrasts with relatively less frequent 
cases of corruption in the Presidency and Parliament by elected officials and 
top-ranking public officers. Corruption among the latter often involves millions 
of dollars, as demonstrated by the case of the country’s former military head of 
state, General Sani Abacha, who was alleged to have deposited billions of 
dollars looted from government treasury in European banks. 
 
 
5.1.5 Perception of Government’s Economic and Social 
Performance 
 
In the past, Nigerian governments have been overthrown based on allegations of 
poor management of the economy and social services provisioning. On 
December 31, 1983, the civilian administration led by Shehu Shagari was 
overthrown by the military. In his broadcast announcing the overthrow of the 
government on the Federal Radio Corporation (a federal government radio 
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agency), Sani Abacha, then a Brigadier, provided the following justification for 
the coup: 
 
‘You are all living witnesses to the grave economic predicament and 
uncertainty which an inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our 
beloved nation for the past four years … Our economy has been 
hopelessly mismanaged … There is inadequacy of food at reasonable 
prices for our people … Health services are in shambles as our 
hospitals are reduced to mere consulting clinics, without drugs, water 
and equipment. Our educational system is deteriorating at an alarming 
rate. Unemployment figures, including graduates have reached 
embarrassing and unacceptable proportions …’ (The Guardian 
(Lagos), January 1, 1984; New Nigeria, January 1, 1984).  
 
Similar arguments were made when that same military government was 
overthrown and a new military government led by Ibrahim Babangida assumed 
power on August 27, 1985. The previous military government was accused of 
insensitivity, repression and incompetence in solving the country’s 
socioeconomic problems (The Guardian, August 28, 1985). 
 
 
Table 6 : Public Assessment of Government's Economic and Social 
Performance 
 
Fairly/very 
well 
How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say? 
2001 
% 
2003 
% 
Fairly/very 
badly 
(2003)  
% 
Don’t 
know or 
haven’t 
heard 
enough 
to say. 
Managing the economy 55 32 67 1 
Keeping prices stable 26 16 84 1 
Creating job 47 23 76 1 
Ensuring everyone has enough to eat 30 22 76 2 
Narrowing the gaps between the rich and 
poor 
26 14 85 1 
Addressing educational needs 61 38 60 1 
Improving basic health services 62 48 51 2 
Delivering household water 43 31 68 1 
Reducing crime 57 38 61 1 
Resolving conflicts between communities 61 45 51 3 
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How well is the Nigerian government managing the economy and addressing 
economic opportunities and social services required by the citizens? Table 6 
presents the analysis of responses from Nigerian respondents.  
 
The performance of government in regards to the management of the economy 
and social services provisioning is evaluated as very poor. However, its 
performance was rated higher in the areas of social services and safety. It was 
rated poorly in terms of economic performance. Comparatively, government 
performance was rated higher during the 2001 survey, reflecting a diminishing 
perception of government efficacy in managing the economy and social 
services. 
 
 
5.1.6 Social, Economic and Political Conditions: Past and 
Present 
 
The struggle against military rule and the quest for democracy in Nigeria 
derived from the repression, corruption and mismanagement of the economy and 
social services that characterised military dictatorship. As a result, democratic 
legitimation may be affected by perception of the performance of the civilian 
government relative to the past military regime. To what extent have 
socioeconomic and political conditions improved or deteriorated relative to the 
past? Relevant data in table 7 shows that substantial improvements were 
reported in the area of civil liberties. However, worsening economic conditions 
were also reported (table 7). 
 
Table 7: A Comparison of Past and Present Social, Economic and 
Political Conditions 
 
Better or 
much better 
Comparing our present system of 
government to  the former system of 
government, are the following things worse 
or better now than they used to be, or 
about the same? 
 
2001 
% 
 
2003 
% 
Same 
 
 
(2003)
% 
Worse or 
much 
worse 
(2003) 
% 
Don’t 
know 
 
(2003) 
% 
Availability of goods 46 33 20 47 1 
People’s standard of living 43 27 16 57 0 
Availability of job opportunities 36 19 17 63 1 
Gaps between rich and poor 24 14 15 71 1 
Freedom to say what you think 82 63 18 18 1 
Freedom to join any political organization 84 68 16 14 2 
Freedom to chose who to vote for 81 63 18 18 2 
Equal and fair treatment for all by 
government 
52 34 27 38 2 
Freedom from being arrested when 
innocent 
71 53 25 20 3 
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The data indicate, therefore that the civilian government has ensured better 
protection of rights to assembly, speech and political choice. But it has not been 
able to effectively address the economic problems confronting the people. 
 
 
5.1.7 Citizens’ Trust in Political Institutions 
 
Trust is used as proxy for the citizens’ confidence in and the legitimation of the 
incumbent government. Nigeria has vibrant and plural civil society, critical 
media and intellectual traditions that have been maintained in spite of protracted 
military rule. While military rule destroyed the institutional base of critical 
intellectual tradition by under-funding the universities, resulting in serious brain 
drain, the spirit of the tradition lives on. Similarly, the media played an active 
role during the decolonisation struggle and under the military rule and continue 
to do so in the present civil rule dispensation. Several civil society groups, 
including religious bodies, trade unions and professional association, cultural 
and community-based development organisations are constantly contesting and 
scrutinising the activities of the government at various levels. These features 
(critical and radical activism, pluralism and vigilance) of civil society in the 
country have implications for trust in political institutions as the activities of 
government are constantly placed in the public domain for scrutiny in spite of 
the effort of government to conceal them.   
 
 
Table 8: Trust in Political Institutions 
 
Political offices and officials A lot A very  
great deal 
A little bit Not at 
all 
President 2003 
2001 
3 
15 
15 
24 
41 
43 
40 
17 
The National Parliament 2003 
2001 
1 
6 
10 
15 
40 
46 
44 
29 
National Electoral Commission 2003 
2001 
2 
5 
10 
16 
34 
45 
49 
30 
The Army 2003 
2001 
3 
5 
18 
9 
34 
31 
44 
52 
Law Courts 2003 
2001 
3 
8 
19 
18 
42 
48 
32 
24 
Police 2003 
2001 
1 
3 
10 
8 
30 
30 
58 
58 
Note: Percentage does not add to 100 because ‘don’t know’ responses are not reported in the 
table. 
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How much trust do Nigerians have in their various political institutions? Figures 
in table 8 show that public institutions are widely distrusted. Level of distrust 
substantially rose between 2001 and 2003 surveys (table 8). 
 
Less than 20% of the respondents trusted the president a lot or a great deal. This 
represents a sharp decline from the 39% that trusted him a lot or a great deal in 
2001. Law courts were the most trusted in 2003, but trust levels in law courts 
were actually higher in 2002. Of particular note and concern is that only the 
military recorded increasing trust from the citizens.  This trend (increasing 
confidence in the military and decreasing trust in civil political institutions), if it 
continues, may have implications for democratic consolidation in the nation.   
 
The descriptive analyses above provides background to the multivariate analyses 
in the second part of this section. Overall, the descriptive analyses show that: 
1. Nigerians prefer democracy more than non-democratic systems of 
government; 
2. They are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. 
Although, the level of support or preference for democracy declined 
between 2001 and 2003, it has not reached a crisis stage, of open agitation 
or movements calling for undemocratic forms of government. A national 
election was conducted in 2003. Domestic and foreign monitors reported 
widespread irregularities in the election (Transition Monitoring Group, 
2003; Alemika 2004). It is not clear whether or not increasing 
dissatisfaction with democracy as well as the decline in support for 
democracy resulted from grievances and disenchantment associated with 
the election. Besides the election, the country has recorded unprecedented 
level of political violence since transition to civil rule led by Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a former military head of state (1976-1979). The impact of the 
high level of political violence and ethno-religious violent conflicts on 
trust in government and democratic legitimation has not yet been studied.  
3. One-half of Nigerian respondents prefer market economy, although more 
than a third (34%) of the respondents also preferred a government-run 
economy. 
4. Government’s social and economic performance was largely assessed as 
very poor. Economic and social conditions were considered as 
deteriorating in relation to the situation under the past system of 
government. However, the political conditions – recognition and 
protection of rights of assembly, association and political choice, and 
freedom from arbitrary arrests were reported to have substantially 
improved under the present system of government. 
5. Nigerian respondents express distrust for the major political institutions 
(presidency, parliament, law courts and judges, police, electoral 
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commission and the army). All the institutions, with the exception of the 
army, recorded a decline in the level of public trust in them between 2001 
and 2003.  
 
 
5.1.8 Explanations of Public Approval of and Trust in 
Political Institutions 
 
The degrees of public approval of political institutions as well as trust in them 
constitute appropriate indicators of the legitimation of the incumbent 
government. In examining the determinants of public approval of and trust in 
political institutions, we carried out a factor analysis of selected questions in the 
Afrobarometer Survey questionnaire. The questions were selected on the basis of 
theoretical and empirical literature on trust and approval (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Levi and 
Stoker 2000; Montero et al 1997; Vassilev 2004; Weatherford 1992; Weil 
1989). Based on the factor analysis, seven factors (approval, corruption 
perception, electoral fairness, political performance - protection of civil liberties, 
poverty, trust and socioeconomic performance) were extracted (table 9) and 
used for analysis in the subsequent sections. All together, the factors seem to be 
dimensions of governance. 
 
Approval factor is very strong and together with trust may be interpreted as 
legitimation dimensions of governance. The bivariate correlation coefficients 
between the two factors are moderately high (table 10).  
 
The two performance and other factors represent explanatory variables. Thus, in 
our multivariate statistical analyses presented in tables 11 and 12, approval and 
trust were dependent variables while the other factors were treated and entered 
as independent variables.  
 
Table 10 presents the bivariate correlation among the variables in the regression 
models in Table 11 and 12. 
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Table 9: Description of Factor Analysis and Scale Reliability Analysis 
Results 
 
Factor 
analysis 
Scale reliability analysisDescription of Composite Scales 
% variance 
explained 
No. of 
questions 
Alpha 
coefficient 
APPROVAL:  
Public approval or disapproval of 
performance of elected officials and judges 
20.08 5 .907 
CORRUPTION:  
Public perception of official corruption in 
key public offices/officials 
6.43 6 .895 
ELECTORAL FAIRNESS:  
Extent to which 2003 elections were 
honestly conducted (free and fair). 
3.88 3 .923 
POLITICAL PERFORMANCE:  
Improvement or deterioration in level of 
civil rights of association, expression, and 
political participation 
4.69 5 .860 
POVERTY:  
Reported frequency of deprivations in basic 
needs – food, health, school fees, water, 
income 
4.25 5 .779 
TRUST:  
Extent of trust in public institutions 
3.11 9 .878 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:  
Handling of economic issues – managing 
the economy, creating jobs, keeping prices 
stable; narrowing inequalities and food 
security 
 
 
 
5 .851 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE:  
Addressing education, health services, 
delivering household water, fighting 
corruption and resolving communal 
conflicts 
3.21 4 .776 
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From the bivariate correlations, public approval of political institutions was 
significantly and positively correlated with perceptions of economic performance, 
social performance, political performance, fairness of elections and affiliation with 
the ruling party, while negatively correlated with corruption.   
 
 
5.1.8.1 Public Approval of Political Institutional Performance 
 
Bivariate correlations do not provide rigorous explanations because their 
coefficients may be influenced by exogenous variables. Multivariate analysis 
minimises this problem. However, linear multivariate regression does not produce 
incontestable causal explanations, and interpretations have to be guided by 
theoretical framework, experience and logic. Table 11 presents a regression 
analysis aimed at an explanation of public approval. Some governance variables 
from table 10 and socio-demographic variables were specified and entered into the 
model as independent variables (table 11). 
 
The multiple regression analysis in table 11 yielded the following results: 
 
1. Economic performance had the most decisive impact on public approval of 
political institutions. In a stepwise regression method, it was the first 
variable to enter the analysis and it also has the highest beta (standardised 
coefficient) weight. Thus, the higher the perception of government economic 
performance, the higher the approval of political institutions. 
2. Social and political performances of the government also have significant 
effect on public approval of public institutions.  
3. Corruption negatively impacts public approval. The higher the perception of 
official corruption, the lower the approval of political institutions. 
4. The extent to which elections are perceived as free and fair also exhibits 
significantly positive relationship with public approval. Those who perceive 
elections as free and fair were more likely to give high approval rating to the 
government. 
5. Religious affiliation also impact public approval. Christians were less likely 
than their Muslim counterparts to give high approval rating to the 
government. The present result is revealing in the sense that it is commonly 
assumed that the Muslims, who are concentrated in the northern part of the 
country are more critical of the president who is a Christian from the South-
western part of the country. But as the result here indicates, the contrary is 
 31
the case. Two explanations may be provided for this result. First, the media 
and human rights’ NGOs are concentrated in the Southern part of the 
country and dominated by Christians. Therefore, critical exposure and 
discussions of the government activities are more prevalent among 
Christians in Southern Nigeria, perhaps resulting in greater knowledge of 
governance and public disapproval of public institutions. The second 
plausible explanation is based on Islamic religious doctrine that generally 
tends to ascribe the source of public or political power to God. Such a 
doctrine engenders less critical attitudes toward authority. In Nigeria, the 
questioning of the exercise of political power by Muslims tend to be 
exercised as sporadic opposition often accompanied with violence rather 
than routinised or institutionalised opposition through the press. 
6. Employment status also impacted approval. But paradoxically, it was those 
who were employed who were less likely to give high approval rating to 
public institutions. Again, exposure to government policies which 
employment provides, especially in the context where government 
performance was perceived as poor, may influence approval. During the past 
two years, the Federal government increased petroleum prices thrice, citing 
international prices, withdrawal of subsidies, and collapse of the nation’s 
refineries and smuggling of the product to the neighbouring countries as 
reasons. On each occasion, the central labour union and the Nigerian Labour 
Congress threatened strike action and actually went on strike on two 
occasions to force government to reduce petroleum prices. In October 2003, 
the government announced a total deregulation and encouraged oil marketers 
to import oil, a move that was widely criticised as subjection of the country 
to imperialism. Furthermore, the policy was compared with the situation 
during the colonial era where agricultural produce was bought cheaply and 
exported only for the resulting finished products to be imported by colonial 
merchant companies and sold at exorbitant prices.  On a symbolic level, the 
price increases were often announced on important national days such as 
October 1 2003 (independence day) and May 29 2004 (5th anniversary of 
return to civil rule). Employed persons were more likely to be exposed to the 
debates and struggles on these issues.   
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Table 11: Determinants of Public Approval of Political Institutional 
Performance 
 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised
coefficients 
Independent variables 
 
B SE Beta 
t-
value 
Significance
Constant 1.214 .123  9.853 .001 
Economic performance .347 .042 .307 8.312 .001 
Social performance .113 .037 .108 3.054 .002 
Political performance 
(Civil rights) 
.171 .023 .202 7.400 .001 
Corruption perception -.207 .027 -.197 -7.578 .001 
Electoral fairness .103 .045 .060 2.325 .020 
Religion 
(Christianity = 1; Islam = 0) 
-.183 .040 -.126 -
.4.548 
.001 
Employment status 
(unemployed = 0;  
employed = 1) 
-.080 .036 -.055 -
.2.220 
.027 
Poverty .003 .021 .004 .152 .879 
Ruling Party affiliation 
(Yes = 1; No = 0) 
.070 .042 .042 1.681 .093 
Education 
(Primary and lower=0; 
Secondary and higher=1) 
.010 .018 .015 .567 .571 
Identity 
(Nigerian  = 1; sub-
national/primordial = 0) 
.009 .036 .006 .244 .807 
R2 = .457; Adjusted R2  = .450 
 
 
5.1.8.2 Citizens’ Trust in Political Institutions 
 
What factors determine trust in political institutions in Nigeria?  This question has 
rarely been investigated in Nigeria.  The analysis presented in table 12 provides 
some answers to the question.  
 
The results of the multiple regression show that the following variables explain 
trust in political institutions by the citizens: 
 
1. Performance variables (economic, social and political) were the most 
significant explanations of trust in government. The higher the perception of 
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government performance, the more the trust in government. This result is 
similar to what was obtained in the analysis of public approval (in table 11). 
 
Table 12: Determinants of Trust in Political Institutions 
 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised
coefficients 
Independent variables 
B SE Beta 
t-value Signifi-
cance 
Constant -.154 .147  -1.046 .296 
Economic performance .305 .050 .247 6.119 .001 
Social performance .160 .044 .140 3.624 .001 
Political performance 
(Civil rights) 
.147 .028 .159 5.317 .001 
Corruption perception -077 .033 -.068 -2.385 .017 
Poverty .054 .025 .060 2.166 .031 
Religion 
(Christianity = 1; Islam = 0) 
-.292 .048 -.184 -6.068 .001 
Electoral fairness .033 .053 .018 .615 .538 
Ruling Party affiliation 
(Yes = 1; No = 0) 
.063 .050 .035 1.265 .206 
Employment status 
(unemployed = 0; employed 
= 1) 
-.012 .043 -.008 -.282 .778 
Education 
(Primary and lower=0; 
Secondary and higher=1) 
-.025 .021 -.034 -1.204 .229 
Identity 
(Nigerian  = 1; sub-
national/primordial = 0) 
.013 .043 .008 .304 .761 
R2 = .339; Adjusted R2  = .331 
 
 
2. Corruption negatively impacts political trust. 
3. Religion also impact on trust in government and in the same direction that 
was found and explained in our earlier analysis of public approval of public 
institutions. 
4. Poverty also impacts trust in government with the poorer segments more 
trusting than the richer individuals. As in the case of employment status 
discussed under the analysis of public approval, the poor may be less 
exposed to government activities and therefore less critical of it, especially 
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in the light of higher poverty rates in rural areas far removed from the 
presence and activities of government. In an earlier analysis (Alemika 2004), 
we discovered that urban dwellers were more distrustful of government than 
their rural counterparts, perhaps a case of the proverbial adage that 
‘familiarity breeds contempt’. 
5. Unemployment status that was a significant explanation of political approval 
was not a significant explanation of trust. Also poverty that was not a 
significant explanation of political approval turned out as a significant 
explanation of political trust. 
6. The results generally support previous studies that performance counts in the 
legitimation of the government (Weil 1989; Vassilev 2004; Bratton and 
Mattes 2001). On a comparative basis, the results for public approval and 
political trust are similar. This indicates that public approval and public trust 
are interrelated concepts predicated on legitimation. As a result, trust was 
excluded from the model on approval just as approval was excluded from 
the regression model on trust.  
 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
There has been debate on whether or not performance by government matters in 
the legitimation of democracy (Vassilev, 2004; Weil 1989; Bratton and Mattes 
2001). The figures in table 1 show a moderately high (although diminishing) 
support for democracy in Nigeria under conditions of (a) widespread 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the country; (b) dissatisfaction 
with government’s economic policy of liberalisation and privatisation; (c) high 
perceptions of widespread and increasing official corruption and (d) high 
perceptions of poor and declining socio-economic performance by government 
(tables 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7).  The tentative conclusion, especially in the light of the 
nature of the data derived from cross-sectional surveys rather than longitudinal 
data, is that democratic regime legitimation is relatively independent of 
government performance, at least in the short run. However, in the transitional 
polities, poor performance may erode democratic regime legitimacy as declining 
support for democracy, increasing distrust of political institutions and growing 
trust in non-democratic institution like the military can be observed (tables 1 and 
8).  
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One significant point borne out by the finding of this study and which has been 
relatively consistent across studies is that democratic regime legitimation may be 
insulated from government performance. This indicates that that the argument in 
favour of separating analysis of legitimation of democratic system from trust in 
incumbent government is valid (Gunther and Monthero 2000). The latter is more 
vulnerable to public perception of performance by government. This study 
indicates that in the context of Nigeria as a transitional society, legitimation of 
democratic regime and incumbent government are affected by economic, social 
and political performances of the government, but at different rates with the impact 
of performance and corruption and legitimacy on the legitimacy of incumbent 
government being more volatile. In the old liberal democracies, poor 
performances, especially economic management, often lead to the defeat of 
incumbent government.  But in transitional polities, like Nigeria and most other 
African nations, where many of the old strongmen and dictators transformed as the 
new rulers and are frustrating free and fair elections and possible alternation of 
political parties and politicians in government, the prospect of democratic 
transition reversal must be seen as an ever present danger. 
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as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
